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Techniques are described herein for Wi-Fi® Protected Access 3 (WPA3) 
Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) client authentication and roaming. The 
validity of a session may be checked before attempting network association with a target 
Access Point (AP). This solution may avoid a delay in network connectivity when the 
previous session is invalid, thereby improving network connectivity for SAE based 
authentication when clients roam across APs. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
The Wi-Fi® Protected Access 3 (WPA3) standard was defined to improve personal 
and enterprise security. WPA3 provides a method to improve personal security by adopting 
Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) based authentication to derive a Pairwise 
Master Key (PMK) using a shared secret password between the Access Point (AP) and 
wireless endpoints (clients). 
The Wireless Local Area Network (LAN) Controller (WLC) or AP and client can 
authenticate each other by exchanging SAE commit and confirm frames as mandated by 
the WPA3 SAE protocol. At the end of SAE authentication, the client and WLC/AP may 
derive the PMK, which is further used in an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) over 
LAN (EAPOL) four-way handshake to derive the session encryption keys to encrypt the 
session traffic between the AP and the wireless client. 
The WPA3 SAE protocol allows the client to perform fast roaming between APs 
using the previously-derived PMK Identifier (PMKID) instead of deriving a new PMKID 
with each AP. In such fast roaming cases, the SAE client sets the PMKID in the Robust 
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Security Network (RSN) Information Element (IE) from the previous association while 
roaming to the new AP. 
When a client roams, it includes the previously-derived PMKID from its previous 
association in a re-association request to the new AP. Upon receipt of the re-association 
request, the WLC/AP may send a re-association response with status code “0” if the 
PMK/PMKID of the previous association is present at the WLC/AP. Otherwise, the 
WLC/AP sends a re-association response with status code “53” followed by de-
authentication frames and the client starts a new session by re-initiating SAE authentication 
with the new AP. 
If the client receives a re-association response with the status code “SUCCESS,” 
the PMKID is valid and the previously-cached PMK is used in the EAPOL four-way 
handshake with the new AP to derive the session keys. 
If the client receives an association response with status code “53” from the new 
AP, the AP does not have the corresponding PMK of the PMKID received in the re-
association request. In this case, the client needs to restart the SAE commit/confirm frames 
to derive a new PMK. Rejecting the client after initiating the association due to PMKID 
mismatch results in slower roaming and delay in connecting to the network. 
Figure 1 below illustrates an example sequence diagram depicting SAE 
authentication and client association using SAE Authentication Key Management (AKM). 
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Figure 1 
There is at least one major difference in PMKID roaming for SAE and other AKM. 
Regarding the re-association request for 802.11i AKM (i.e., a standard roaming method 
using PMKID, as per the 802.11i standard), if the PMKID is not valid, the client is forced 
to undergo the full authentication process to derive a new security association PMK without 
sending any de-authentication frames.  
However, in the case of WPA3 SAE, the AP is expected to send the de-
authentication frame to the client if the PMKID received in the re-association request does 
not match the PMKID present at the WLC/AP. In the SAE based roaming scenario, if the 
PMKID is invalid, client receives a de-authentication trigger and has to start SAE 
authentication again. The de-authentication trigger after detecting the invalid PMKID in 
the re-association request can delay client connection to the network. 
Figure 2 below illustrates an example sequence diagram depicting roaming using a 
PMKID. 
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Figure 2 
Techniques are described herein to improve WPA3 SAE client connectivity by 
early detection of the validity of the security association with the new AP even before 
attempting network association. This helps wireless clients roam faster, thereby improving 
the network connectivity experience. 
As described herein, roaming delay and latency for SAE clients are optimized when 
there is no common PMKID between APs and wireless clients. There are several methods 
to allow the client to check the validity of the PMKID before attempting network 
association in order to avoid de-authentication as well as seamless roaming. 
The first method involves including the PMKID in an open authentication frame. 
A tag may include the PMKID in an 802.11 open authentication sequence one frame. The 
WLC/AP may verify the PMKID in the 802.11 open authentication frame and reply with a 
new status code to indicate whether PMKID validation was successful. If the client receives 
the PMKID validation success status code in the open authentication response, it may 
decide to perform re-association and complete the roaming with the new AP without de-
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authentication. This saves four frames in the case of PMKID mismatch, namely the 
association request, the association response, disassociation, and de-authentication. This 
first method helps to improve network connectivity while the client is roaming across APs.  
Figure 3 below illustrates an example sequence diagram that depicts the case when 




Figure 4 below illustrates an example sequence diagram that depicts the case when 
the PMKID does not match the PMKID stored in the WLC/AP cache. 
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Figure 4 
The second method uses the PMKID in an SAE commit message/frame. Here, the 
client is associated to a wireless network using SAE authentication. When the client 
decides to roam to a new AP, the wireless client sends the SAE commit message with the 
PMKID therein. The PMKID may be encoded in a vendor specific tag along with its scalar 
and finite field element. Upon receiving the SAE commit message from the client, if the 
vendor specific element containing the PMKID is present, the WLC/AP may check for 
PMKID validity. If the PMKID found to be valid, the WLC/AP includes the PMKID tag 
in the SAE commit message to indicate that the client may use the PMKID. If the PMKID 
is found to be invalid, the WLC/AP may continue the SAE authentication sequence by 
sending the SAE commit frame to derive a new PMK. The second method thus enables the 
client to start with an SAE authentication frame instead of an open authentication frame. 
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In case of a PMKID mismatch, four frames will be saved, namely the association request, 
the association response, disassociation, and de-authentication. 
The third method uses a Generic Advertisement Service (GAS) public action frame 
to validate the PMKID. The GAS frame may be used to check the validity of the PMKID 
before attempting PMKID-based roaming. The client may send the GAS frame with the 
PMKID therein to the WLC/AP before attempting roaming. The WLC/AP validates the 
PMKID received in the GAS frame and sends the response with a success/failure status. If 
the status is “SUCCESS,” the client may initiate the roaming to that AP. Otherwise, the 
client initiates SAE authentication to derive a new PMK as the PMKID is no longer valid 
on the AP. Accordingly, in case of PMKID mismatch, four frames will be saved. However, 
in the interest of checking the validity of PMKID, two additional frames (namely, GAS 
request and response) may be used. Thus, the third method effectively saves two frames. 
The fourth method uses the PMKID in a probe request/response. The PMKID is 
added in the probe request in a similar manner as the first method (i.e., including the 
PMKID in the open authentication frame). Before roaming, the client may check the 
validity of the PMKID by including it in a probe request. The WLC/AP may, in turn, send 
a probe response with a new status code to indicate the PMKID validity. If the status code 
is set as “SUCCESS,” the client may proceed with sending the association request with the 
PMKID as the roam will be successful. If the status code is “failure,” the client may directly 
initiate an SAE handshake and save three frames. In case of PMKID mismatch, four frames 
will be saved. However, in the interest of checking the validity of PMKID, two additional 
frames (namely, probe request and response) may be used. Thus, the third method 
effectively saves two frames. 
The fifth method involves querying for PMKID using Access Network Query 
Protocol (ANQP) messaging (e.g., a Passpoint ANQP query). Before roaming, the client 
may initiate an ANQP query with the new PMKID subtype in a vendor information ID to 
obtain the current PMKID stored at the WLC/AP. The WLC may send the ANQP response 
along with current valid PMKID for this client. The client may initiate the re-association 
request if the PMKID received in the ANQP response matches the PMKID held by the 
client. If the received PMKID does not match, the client may start SAE authentication to 
derive a new PMK. Accordingly, in case of PMKID mismatch, four frames will be saved. 
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However, in the interest of checking the validity of the PMKID, two additional frames 
(namely, ANQP query and response) may be used. Thus, the third method effectively saves 
two frames. 
This solution improves the roaming experience for many use cases. In one use case, 
wireless network deployment uses multiple vendors, such as public Wi-Fi (e.g., a stadium). 
If the client has an option to roam to one of two APs belonging to different vendors, the 
client may decide whether to initiate SAE handshake or send an association request with 
the PMKID. 
A second use case involves single vendor deployment. If the client has an option to 
roam to one of two APs belonging to two different WLCs which are not in the same 
mobility group, the client may precisely decide to roam to a given AP using the techniques 
described herein. 
A third use case involves a flex group. For example, a WLC may support multiple 
flex groups and the PMK may be shared proactively by the WLC within the flex group. If 
the client has an option to roam to one of two APs belonging to two different flex groups, 
the client may decide to roam to the AP that has the PMK. 
A fourth use case involves session expiry. Here, the WLC may wait for one second 
upon session expiry before sending disassociation and deauthentication messages. If the 
client roams within this wait period of one second, the WLC may respond to the client by 
sending an association response with status code “53.” The client may check the validity 
of the PMKID and preclude four frames (i.e., association request, association response, 
disassociation, and de-authentication). Thus, the solution described herein may save up to 
four frames. 
In summary, techniques are described herein for WPA3 SAE client authentication 
and roaming. The validity of a session may be checked before attempting network 
association with a target AP. This solution may avoid a delay in network concavity when 
the previous session is invalid, thereby improving network connectivity for SAE based 
authentication when clients roam across APs. 
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